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THE NAKED TRUTH: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK INTO
THE QUESTION OF HEARSAY ADMISSIBILITY
AT PROBATION VIOLATION HEARINGS IN
MASSACHUSETTS, THE APPLICATION OF RULE
6, AND WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR THE FUTURE
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PROBATION SYSTEM
The Emperor'sNew Suit
An Emperor of a prosperous city who cares more about clothes
than military pursuits or entertainmenthires two swindlers who promise
him the finest suit of clothes from the most beautiful cloth. This cloth, they
tell him, is invisible to anyone who was either stupid or unfit for his
position. The Emperor cannot see the (non-existent) cloth, but pretends that
he can for fear of appearingstupid; his ministers do the same. When the
swindlers report that the suit is finished, they dress him in mime. The
Emperor then goes on a procession through the capitalshowing off his new
"clothes." During the course of the procession, a small child cries out,
"the emperor is naked!" The crowd realizes the child is telling the truth.
The Emperor, however, holds his head high and continues the procession.
Hans ChristianAndersen 1837
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the federal government from denying "life, liberty, or property" from any
person without due process of law.' In a criminal prosecution, the line is
clear: the protections provided by the Constitution for a criminal defendant
are absolute.2 However, after the adjudication of a defendant's case, the
court's disposition has significant repercussions on the accused's liberty.3

I

U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting states from

depriving life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
2 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (noting difference between criminal
prosecution and revocation of parole). In a criminal prosecution, a citizen's liberty is at stake,
thus that citizen is entitled to the absolute protections of the Constitution. See id.
3 A defendant found guilty is subject to the "sentence" imposed by the court. BLACK'S LAW
1485 (9th ed. 2006). The extent of a defendant's loss of liberty varies greatly
depending on the sentence imposed, from the total loss of liberty, to the "conditional liberty"
DICTIONARY
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Although statutorily dependent, many states-including Massachusettsgrant judges the discretion to order probation in a criminal case after a
finding of guilty or after a continuance without a finding. 4 While on
probation, a probationer has "conditional liberty." 5 As such, once it is
determined a probationer has violated one or more of the contingencies
upon which his liberty rests, his probation can be revoked and his liberty
forfeited.6 A probation violation hearing illuminates this conditional
liberty status because the same system that granted probation now has the
discretion to take it away.7 Unlike the bright line set out by the United
States Constitution for a criminal defendant on trial, the line defining which
constitutional protections are afforded to a probationer during a probation
violation hearing is less well-defined.8 Likewise, the evidentiary standards
used to enforce those constitutional protections afforded to probationers are
more relaxed compared to the evidentiary standards governing criminal
trials .9

restrictions of a probationer. See Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Mass.
1990).
4 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87 (2004) (authorizing court to place person in
care of probation officer); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1 (1998) (outlining procedure for
utilizing probation as suspended sentence).
5 See Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1197 (providing probationer's liberty may be taken away if he
violates conditions imposed upon him).
6 See id. at 1197-98 (concluding due process requirements sufficient to determine
whether
probation revocation proper); see also MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 5(b)
cmt. (acknowledging probation violation does not compel order of revocation).
7 See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 1 cmt. (describing scope and
purpose of probation violation proceedings). The commentary acknowledges that even though
most of the relevant case law refers to the proceedings as "probation revocation hearings," the
rules actually govern "probation violation proceedings." Id. This distinction is important
because the decision to revoke a probationer's probation, or order any other disposition, can only
proceed if a probation violation is found. Id.; see also MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION
PROCEEDINGS 5(b) (identifying adjudication and determining "disposition of the matter" as "two
distinct steps" in revocation process).
8 See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (noting probationers may not
be denied due process because probation is an "act of grace"); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972) (providing parolee's constitutional rights limited because parole revocations not
part of criminal prosecution); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133 -34 (1967) (holding probationer
entitled to representation by counsel at combined revocation and sentencing hearing); Durling,
551 N.E.2d at 1197 ("[A] probationer's liberty interest is conditional. It was given to him as a
matter of grace when the State had the right to imprison him."); Commonwealth v. Brown, 504
N.E.2d 668, 671 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (noting "less formal and less stringent" due process
protections required at probation hearings).
9 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 (noting Supreme Court decides minimum requirements of
due process, but States write procedure); see also MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION
PROCEEDINGS 1 (articulating fundamental differences between probationer and defendant
protections); MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6 (prescribing requirements of
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Accordingly, states across the country developed their own state
and local district court rules outlining probation violation procedures.10
This Note addresses the current discrepancies in Massachusetts law
surrounding the admissibility of hearsay evidence at probation violation
proceedings." Specifically, this Note shows how the Supreme Judicial
Court's ("SJC") decision in Commonwealth v. Negron 12 is inconsistent with
the language, application, and intent of Rule 6 of the District Court Rules
for Probation Violation Proceedings ("Rule 6").' 3 Part II discusses the
history and purpose of probation in Massachusetts and chronicles the
relevant case law giving rise to the current state of the law. 14 Part III
explains the existing disparity in Massachusetts law. '" Part IV highlights
the incorrect application of Rule 6 in Negron and its progeny by examining
the Massachusetts courts' reasoning with respect to the admissibility of
hearsay evidence at probation violation hearings both before and after Rule
6's enactment. 16 Additionally, Part IV explores the immediate and longterm consequences of safeguarding probationers' constitutional rights,
addressing Massachusetts' history of shying away from awarding
constitutional protections to probationers; 17 Rule 6's consistency with
probation's purpose; 8 and, whether awarding constitutional protections to

admissibility of hearsay evidence at probation violation proceedings); Commonwealth v. Durling,
551 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Mass. 1990) (stating hearsay evidence at probation violation hearings not
per se prohibited by due process clause). See generally Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d
1240, 1248 (Mass. 2006) (concluding Article XII confrontation right does not apply at probation
violation hearings); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 629 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(acknowledging ordinary hearsay prohibition non-applicable in probation revocation hearings
with good cause).
10 See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Sufficiency of Hearsay Evidence in
Probation Revocation Hearings, 21 A.L.R. 771 (2007) [hereinafter Shields, Sufficiency of
Hearsay] (outlining hearsay sufficiency requirements at probation revocation hearings by state);
Annotation, Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Probation Revocation Hearings, 11 A.L.R.
999 (1982) [hereinafter Admissibility of Hearsay] (outlining admissibility of hearsay evidence at
probation revocation hearings by state).
11 See infra Parts 11-V (discussing admissibility of hearsay evidence at probation violation
hearings).
12 808 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 2004).
13 See infra Part IV.A (analyzing court's application of Rule 6 in Negron decision).
14 See infra Part

II.

See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV.A (analyzing admissibility of hearsay evidence at probation violation
15

hearings in Massachusetts state courts).
17 See infra Part IV.B (highlighting conundrum of the Negron decision).
18 See infra Part IV.C (discussing effects of expanding constitutional protections on concept
of conditional liberty).
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probationers compromises the purpose of probation.' 9 Lastly, Part V calls
for legislative and judicial action to reconcile the present incongruity in the
law.2 0 This Note suggests that the language of Rule 6 is consistent with the
original rehabilitation goals of probation. 21
II.

HISTORY

A. Probationin Massachusetts
The concept of probation is deeply rooted in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. 22 Probation's original purpose was rehabilitation. 23 A
revolutionary concept of its time, the probation system not only restored
power to the judiciary, but shifted the focus of corrections to the
individual.24 Massachusetts' system was deemed a success and the concept

19 See infra Part IV.C (analyzing effects of expanding constitutional protections on purpose
of probation).
20 See infra Part V.
21 See infra Part V. (concluding Rule 6's language is consistent with larger rehabilitative

purpose of probation).
22 See Charles L. Chute, The Development ofProbation in the United States, in PROBATION
225, 227-28 (Sheldon Glueck ed., Arno Press 1974) (1933). Probation
originated in Massachusetts in 1878. Id. at 227. "Bailing on probation" served as the earliest
method of placing a person on probation: prior to sentencing, but after adjudication, the defendant
may be released for a sum of money ("bail" or "bond") provided the probation officer brings the
probationer back to court on a specific date. Id. at 227-28. This method is still used today,
although in the vernacular, the word "probation" implies the specific alternative sanction imposed
by the court. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (9th ed. 2009) ("[Probation: ] A
court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, releases a convicted person
into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or prison."); LOUIS P. CARNEY,
PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 83-84 (Susan H. Munger & Myrna
W. Breskin eds., 1977) (defining probation).
23 See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Mass. 2006) ("The purpose of
probation . . . 'is
to enable the [convicted] person to get on his feet, to become law abiding and to
lead a useful and upright life under the fostering influence of the probation officer."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Mariano v. Hibbard, 137 N.E.2d 369, 370 (Mass. 1922))). See generally 24
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2145 (2010) (characterizing purpose of probation as rehabilitating
offenders without confinement and protecting public); CARNEY, supra note 22, at 85
(condemning brutal and lengthy imprisonments for breeding hostility and reinforcing criminal
tendencies). Several theoretical justifications are used to rationalize probation, including: (1)
maximizing community-based influences in the correctional processes; (2) eliminating physical
and psychological degradation of prisoners; (3) humanizing the rehabilitation process; and (4)
heeding the mass of evidence supporting diversion, as opposed to incarceration, is the more
effective correctional device. CARNEY, supra note 22, at 86.
24 See Thorsten Sellin, The Trial Judge's Dilemma: A Criminologist's View, in PROBATION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 99, 100-01 (Sheldon Glueck ed., Arno Press 1974) (1933). Probation
commenced the individualization of penal treatment, focusing on the criminal's character rather
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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of probation quickly spread throughout the country. 25 As a result,
probation, and its underlying purpose of rehabilitation,
spawned a modern
26
trend towards community-based corrections.
Under current Massachusetts law, any state court with criminal
jurisdiction has authority to place an individual on probation.27 Chapter
276, section 87A of the Massachusetts General Laws bestows virtually
boundless discretion upon the judiciary with respect to the contingencies it
is authorized to impose as conditions of probation. 28 Similar to the broad
latitude afforded to the judiciary in sentencing probation, there is also
29
ample discretion in the type of conduct that warrants revocation.
B. Probation Violations Hearingsand HearsayEvidence in Massachusetts

Massachusetts has developed, adopted, and modified a set of rules
tailored specifically for probation violation hearings.30 Consequently, the

than the nature of the offense. Id. at 10 1-02. Notably, probation provided the judiciary with vast
discretion over a host of sentencing issues including but not limited to: whether a convict should
serve a definitive, general or a limited indeterminate length sentence; whether a convict served his
sentence in a penal institution; whether to order a suspended sentence with or without probation,
and whether to sentence a convict to probation alone or to a combination of probation, costs and
restitution. Id. at 102-03.
25 See Chute, supra note 22, at 229-32 (chronicling spread of probation).
26 See generally CARNEY, supra note 22, at 84-86 (discussing arguments supporting
probation system).
27 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87 (2004). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The superior court, any district court and any juvenile court may place on probation in
the care of its probation officer any person before it charged with an offense or a crime
for such time and upon such conditions as it deems proper, with the defendant's
consent, before trial and before a plea of guilty, or in any case after a finding of verdict
of guilty ....
Id.
28

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87A (2004). "The conditions of probation imposed by a

court upon a person ... may include, but shall not be limited to, participation by said person in
specified rehabilitative programs or performance by said person of specified community service
work for a stated period of time." Id.
29 See generally CARNEY, supra note 22, at 118-20 (detailing historic criteria for probation
revocation). The probation system's individualized nature allows for a level of flexibility in its
operation and framework. Id. at 119. As such, there remains no fixed formula as to what specific
conduct warrants revocation, and states developed their own procedures defining how and why
probation may be revoked. See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 1 cmt.
(identifying "all or nothing" misconception that revocation must follow violation finding). But
see McHoul v. Commonwealth, 312 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Mass. 1974) (recognizing probation
disposition is a matter of court discretion and cannot be revoked arbitrarily).
30 See MASS. DIST. CT.R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 1-9 (outlining rules of probation
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unique problem of apportioning constitutional rights to probationers was
born.3' The admissibility of hearsay evidence at a probation violation
hearing varies greatly from state to state and creates issues surrounding a
probationer's constitutional rights to due process and confrontation. 32
Following the landmark probation violation hearing decision in
Commonwealth v. Durling,3 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Rule
6. 3 4 Pursuant to Rule 6(a), hearsay evidence is admissible at probation

violation hearings); see also Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1248 (Mass. 2006)
(noting evidence admissible at revocation proceedings not otherwise admissible in adversary
criminal trial) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
31 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (referencing various absolute and conditional
constitutional rights of probationers); see also Mary T. Casey, Note, Due Process in Probation
Revocation v. Self Incrimination:A Comparative Perspectivefor the MassachusettsProbationer,
17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181, 187-97 (1991) (discussing due process

protections for probationers in Massachusetts). Notably, a probationer does not have the right of
confrontation in a probation or parole violation hearing because the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution does not apply, as such hearings are not considered "criminal prosecutions." See
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... ). The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
expands the confrontation right:
No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him .... And every subject shall have
a right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face ....

And no subject shall be

arrested ... put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty,
or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
MASS. CONST. art. XII (emphasis added). But see Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d at 1249-50 (concluding
probationer has no absolute right to confrontation in Massachusetts).
32 See Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Mass. 1990) (observing
probationer has liberty interest at stake in violation proceedings); see also Commonwealth v.
Maggio, 605 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Mass. 1993) (providing existence of reliable hearsay establishes
"good cause" to deny probationer right of confrontation). See generally Casey, supra note 31, at
187-97 (discussing Massachusetts' interpretation of due process protections for probationers pre1991); Admissibility of Hearsay, supra note 10, at § 3(a)-(b) (outlining admissibility of hearsay
evidence at probation revocation hearing by each state). Unlike Massachusetts, which allows for
the general admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to Rule 6(a), other states have expressly taken
the position that the admission of hearsay evidence is either dependent upon compliance with
minimum due process standards or inadmissible altogether. See State v. Verdolini, 819 A.2d 901,
905 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) ("It is well settled that probation proceedings are informal and that
strict rules of evidence do not apply to them. (citation omitted). Hearsay evidence may be
admitted in a probation revocation hearing if it is relevant, reliable and probative."); Barnett v.
State, 392 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (stating hearsay inadmissible at probation
revocation proceedings); State v. DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I. 1978) (noting
determination of "good cause" condition precedent to admission of hearsay).
33 551 N.E.2d 1193 (Mass. 1990).
34 See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6 & cmt. (acknowledging rule
based "almost exclusively" on Durling). In Durling, the SJC noted that "[t]his court has always
allowed the use of hearsay at probation revocation hearings." 551 N.E.2d at 1197. Thus, the

2011]

HEARSAY ADMISSIBILITY

violation hearings.35 When an alleged probation violation is based solely
on hearsay evidence, Rule 6(b) provides guidelines establishing the
sufficiency of hearsay evidence.3 6
Prior to Rule 6's enactment, hearsay evidence was consistently
admitted at probation violation hearings. 37 Notably, the majority of cases
issue before the court was not whether hearsay was admissible, but rather, to what extent a court
may rely on hearsay evidence in revoking probation. Id. In resolving this issue, the court stated
that, "[u]nsubstantiated and unreliable hearsay cannot, consistent with due process, be the entire
basis of a probation revocation." Id. at 1199. Reliable hearsay, however, can be the basis of a
revocation: "In situations where the Commonwealth seeks to rely on evidence not subject to
cross-examination, the due process touchstone of an accurate and reliable determination still
remains." Id. at 1198-99. Although standard evidentiary rules do not apply to probation
revocation hearings, the Durling court concluded that the first step "is to determine whether the
evidence would be admissible under those rules" because "[e]vidence which would be admissible
under standard evidentiary rules is presumptively reliable." Id. Importantly, this statement does
not impute an admissibility requirement, only a guideline for evaluating the reliability of admitted
hearsay evidence. Id. at 1198-99. But cf Casey, supra note 31, at 194 (suggesting Durling
provided new standard of hearsay admissibility in probation hearings). The Durling court opined
that the confrontation issue would more appropriately be resolved on a case-by-case basis and
will depend on the totality of the circumstances. Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1199. Specifically, the
SJC held, "[i]f the Commonwealth has 'good cause' for not using a witness with personal
knowledge, and instead offers reliable hearsay or other evidence, then the requirements of due
process are satisfied." Id. (emphasis added).
35 MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(a). Due to the informal nature
of
probation violation hearings, as well as the fact that the case against the probationer is brought by
a probation officer instead of a trained criminal prosecutor, the court is responsible for
determining the reliability of hearsay evidence. See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION
PROCEEDINGS 6(a) cmt.
36 See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(b). Rule 6(b) provides:
Where the sole evidence submitted to prove a violation of probation is hearsay, that
evidence shall be sufficient only if the court finds in writing (1) that such evidence is
substantially trustworthy and demonstrably reliable and (2), if the alleged violation is
charged or uncharged criminal behavior, that the probation officer has good cause for
proceeding without a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence presented.
Id. (emphasis added). As such, Rule 6(b) applies only when hearsay evidence is the sole evidence
of the probationer's alleged violation and does not deal with the issue of admissibility, but rather
addresses the issue of legal sufficiency. See id. at cmt. Conversely, where unreliable hearsay
evidence is presented at a probation violation hearing along with reliable hearsay or other
evidence, due process is satisfied. See Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1199 (noting unreliable hearsay
must be accompanied with other evidence to satisfy due process). Nothing in Rule 6(b) or the
Durling decision precludes the admission of unreliable hearsay, only that unreliable hearsay
cannot serve as the entire basis of a probation violation. See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB.
VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(b) cmt.; Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1199.
37 See Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1197 ("This court has always allowed the use of hearsay at
probation revocation hearings."); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669, 671
(Mass. 1989) (emphasizing importance of admitting all reliable evidence relating to probationer's
conduct); In re Brown, 480 N.E.2d 301, 302 (Mass. 1985) (admitting hearsay evidence that was
insufficient but properly admitted); Commonwealth v. Calvo, 668 N.E.2d 846, 848 (Mass. App.
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where a probationer was found to have violated probation and had his
probation revoked and the revocation was reversed on appeal, turn on the
issue of whether the evidence offered to prove the violation was sufficient,
not inadmissible.38 Following Rule 6's enactment, between the years 2000
and 2004, hearsay evidence continued to be regularly admitted into
evidence at probation violation hearings . 39 The SJC shifted the focus of
Rule 6's application from sufficiency to admissibility in 2004, through the
Negron decision. 40 As a result, the decisions following Negron provide
contradictory applications of Rule 6 resulting in inconsistent case law. 4 '

Ct. 1996) (concluding police report containing sworn witness statements was admissible at
probation violation hearing); Commonwealth v. Joubert, 647 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995) (permitting hearsay inadmissible under "standard evidentiary rules" as evidence of
probation violations). But see Commonwealth v. Delaney, 629 N.E.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (holding violation finding erroneous because based on inadmissible hearsay
despite additional non-hearsay evidence).
38 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maggio, 605 N.E.2d 1247, 1250-51
(Mass. 1993) (finding
evidence at probation violation hearing was insufficient); In re Brown, 480 N.E.2d 301, 302
(Mass. 1985) (determining bulk of hearsay introduced was unreliable); Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 716 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding police report lacked sufficient
reliability).
39 See Commonwealth v. Cates, 786 N.E.2d 411, 413-14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (finding
good cause and substantial trustworthiness to admit hearsay); Commonwealth v. Ivers, 778
N.E.2d 942, 944-46 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (acknowledging pragmatic necessity of hearsay
evidence).
40 See Commonwealth v. Negron, 808 N.E.2d 294, 299 (Mass. 2004)
("The proper inquiry
[in determining whether hearsay statements are admissible at probation revocation hearings] is
whether the hearsay evidence itself had substantial indicia of reliability establishing good cause
for overcoming the need for confrontation.").
41 Compare Commonwealth v. Nunez, 841 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 n.6 (Mass. 2006)
(assuming
judicial determination of reliability when hearsay objection overruled at probation violation
hearing), Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1250 (Mass. 2006) (concluding due
process not offended when "substantially reliable" hearsay admitted at probation violation
hearing), and Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1199 (Mass. 1990) ("If the proffered
evidence is not admissible under standard evidentiary rules, then a court must independently look
to the reliability of that evidence. Unsubstantiated and unreliable hearsay cannot, consistent with
due process, be the entire basis of a probation revocation."), with Commonwealth v. King, 886
N.E.2d 727, 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding police report insufficient despite "good cause"
because of unreliable and untrustworthy hearsay). On September 30, 2009, the SJC granted
further appellate review on the issue presented in Thissell. Commonwealth v. Thissell, 914
N.E.2d 330, 330 (Mass. 2009). The issue on appeal was whether the hearsay evidence admitted
into evidence, which served as the basis of the violation finding, and which was used to revoke
Thissell's probation, violated his due process rights according to Durling. Commonwealth v.
Thissell, 928 N.E.2d 932, 933 (Mass. 2010). The trial court revoked Thissell's probation in part
based on GPS maps and logs which documented his alleged probation violation. Commonwealth
v. Thissell, 910 N.E.2d 943, 946 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009), aff'd, 928 N.E.2d 932 (Mass. 2010). In
upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the documents, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
reasoned that the maps and logs generated by the GPS were not hearsay and therefore admissible.
Id. On July 1, 2010, the SJC affirmed the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Thissell.
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III. THE NEGRON DECISION
In Negron, the Commonwealth petitioned a single justice of the
SJC seeking relief from the district court's evidentiary ruling at a probation
violation hearing. 42 The trial court's ruling excluded the statements made
by the probationer's wife to the testifying officer, finding the wife's
statements were "inadmissible hearsay of questionable reliability., 43 On
appeal, the SJC rejected the trial court's determination that the wife's
invocation of her marital privilege was indicative of the statements'
unreliability, and instead, held that "[t]he proper inquiry [in determining
admissibility] is whether the hearsay evidence itself had substantial indicia
of reliability establishing good cause for overcoming the need for
confrontation., 44
In addition to the newly announced reliability
prerequisite, in a footnote at the very end of its decision, the SJC alluded to
an additional factor preceding admissibility, noting, "[a]dmission of the
hearsay also includes, of course, an additional implicit determination that
the witness who is reporting the hearsay .. . is doing so accurately. 45

Thissell, 928 N.E.2d at 933.
42 808 N.E.2d at 298 (challenging district court's decision excluding wife's testimony). In
Negron, the probationer was alleged to have violated his probation pursuant to the issuance of a
criminal complaint charging him "with assault on his wife, malicious damage to a motor vehicle,
malicious destruction of property exceeding $250 (two counts), leaving the scene of property
damage, and arson of a dwelling house.". Id. at 298. Prior to the trial court determining whether
the probationer violated the terms of his probation, the SJC stayed the violation proceedings to
allow the Commonwealth to pursue its application for relief Id. at 296 n. 1.
43 Negron, 808 N.E.2d at 298. The trial court improperly found the probationer's wife was
available as a witness, despite her valid claim of spousal privilege. Id. at 299. As a matter of law,
a person is unavailable if he or she refuses to testify pursuant to a valid claim of marital privilege.
Id. Moreover, the SJC noted the wife's assertion of her marital privilege had no bearing on
whether or not her statements to the officers at the scene were otherwise reliable. Id. In addition,
notwithstanding the fact the testifying officer was also the officer who responded to the incident,
the trial court also rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the wife's statements qualified for
admission under the spontaneous utterance exception because the officer testified the wife did not
appear upset when she spoke with him. Id. at 298. However, the court permitted the testifying
officer to testify to his personal observations. Id. The officer testified that when the police
entered the apartment "itwas engulfed in a smoky haze due to the fact that the stove's four
electric burners had been turned on with 'the covers on them,' and the covers had all been
'charred."' Id. Additionally, the officer testified that the apartment was in "a state of disarray,"
with "items broken and furniture overturned," and that there was an automobile outside with front
end damage and scrapes on the back. Id.
44 Negron, 808 N.E.2d at 299.
45 Id. at 300 n.8. In footnote 8, the SJC departed from a well-established evidentiary concept
and suggested that the court must evaluate a witness' credibility prior to admission. In doing so,
the SJC departed from the well-established principle that the fact finder, not the court, judges the
witness's credibility. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 383 N.E.2d 851, 856 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978) (articulating long-standing principle that fact finder has ultimate appraisal of testimony's
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Anarchy. The InconsistentManner in Which HearsayEvidence is
Admitted atProbation Violation Hearings.
There is a significant difference between the decision to admit
evidence and the question of what to do with evidence once it has been
admitted.46 As a result of Negron, the admissibility of hearsay evidence at
probation violation hearings remains unclear.4 7 Rule 6 codified the SIC's
Durling decision. 48 Rule 6(a) expressly states that hearsay evidence is
admissible at a probation violation hearing.49
Moreover, Rule 6(b)
provides for a "sufficiency check" when the only evidence submitted to
prove a probation violation is hearsay.50 In Negron, the SIC entertained the
Commonwealth's appeal which challenged the district court's ruling that
hearsay evidence was inadmissible, before it found the probationer violated
his probation. 5' In remedying the error, the SIC effectively redefined Rule
6,52 despite determining that the lower court erred in its evidentiary
53
ruling.

credibility).
46 See supra notes 3 5-36 and accompanying text (distinguishing two unique and independent
subsections of Rule 6). When hearsay is admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 6(a), it does not
mean that a judge will refuse to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence prior to finding a
probationer has violated his probation as provided for in Rule 6(b). See MASS. DIST. CT. R.
PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(b) cmt. (stressing court must balance interests of probationer
and Commonwealth by looking at "totality of the circumstances").
47 Compare supra text accompanying note 44 (prescribing substantial indicia of
reliability as
proper inquiry for admitting hearsay evidence), with supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text
(providing hearsay evidence automatically admissible at probation violation hearing pursuant to
Rule 6).
48 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining origin and commentary of Rule 6).
49 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 6(a)). In accordance with Rule
6(a), unreliable hearsay, although not worthy of the court's consideration, does not render it
inadmissible but rather insufficient to justify a violation on its own. See MASS. DIST. CT. R.
PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(a) cmt.
50 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (outlining language and scope of Rule
6(b)).
The application of Rule 6(b) rests on the underlying presumption that the hearsay evidence was
admitted into evidence. See supra note 37 (explaining limits on probationer's confrontation
right). However, there is no preliminary evidentiary hearing prior to the probation violation
hearing. MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATIONS PROCEEDINGS 1-9.
51 See supra note 42 (stating interlocutory appeal allowed prior to district court determining
probation violated).
52 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (remanding case to determine issue of
reliability
as prerequisite to admission).
53 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (noting invocation of spousal privilege does
not render spouse available and therefore hearsay statements are unreliable).
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By announcing a new standard for admissibility of hearsay
evidence at probation violation hearings, Negron serves as the black sheep
in a long line of precedential case law.14 However, prior to the 2004
Negron decision, courts admitted hearsay into evidence inconsistently at
probation violation hearings. 55 Rather than clarifying the issue, Negron and
its progeny only add to the calamitous state surrounding
the substantive law
56
that governs probation violation proceedings.
54 Compare supra text accompanying note 44 (announcing proper determination of
admissibility is reliability), with supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (outlining precedential
case law from 1985 through Negron).
55 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (outlining Massachusetts case law
historically regarding admission of hearsay evidence at probation violation hearings).
56 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in substantive law
of probation violation proceedings); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing
Massachusetts case law post-Negron). Since the Negron decision, courts have continued to admit
and exclude hearsay evidence inconsistently at probation violation hearings, relying on their own
interpretation of the muddled-hybrid rules articulated since Durling. See Commonwealth v.
Nunez, 841 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Mass. 2006) ("'JI]f reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause
requirement is satisfied,' and a probationer may be denied the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses at a probation revocation hearing." (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Negron, 808 N.E.2d 294, 300 (Mass. 2004))); Commonwealth v. King, 886 N.E.2d 727, 740
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) ("Where hearsay is the only evidence of a violation, 'the indicia of
reliability must be substantial' to overcome the defendant's 'interest in cross -examining the actual
source."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1199 (Mass. 1990))). In Nunez,
the lower court judge found that the probationer violated his probation. 841 N.E.2d at 1252. In
making his decision, the judge relied on the testimony of the victim, the arresting officer, and the
probation officer. Id. at 1253. On appeal, the probationer argued that his right to cross-examine
witnesses under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 12 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was violated by the admission of hearsay without a
finding of good cause, and where the hearsay was unreliable. Id. at 1252. In rebutting the
probationer's argument, the SJC not only misguidedly relied on the rule set out in Negron, but
also failed to make reference to the evidentiary rule at issue, namely Rule 6. 808 N.E.2d at 296300. The court in Nunez noted, "[a]lthough the judge did not explicitly state that he found the
hearsay reliable, that conclusion is implicit in the fact that he made findings based on the hearsay
evidence." 841 N.E.2d at 1254. In upholding the probation violation, the court in Nunez
presumed a finding of reliability based on the hearing judge's response to the probationer's
objection to the admission of hearsay evidence; specifically, that the hearing judge stated "This is
a probation surrender hearing; your objection is overruled." Id. at 1254 n.6. The SJC's
assumption in Nunez relies on its misstated rule in Negron, and thus completely disregards the
possibility that the objection was overruled because hearsay evidence is admissible at a probation
violation hearing, as provided by Rule 6. See id. In King, the court misapplied the admissibility
analysis set forth in Negron, noting the "significant observations by the officers [in Negron]
bolstered the reliability of the victim's hearsay statements as reported by the officer." King, 886
N.E.2d at 731 n.8. Despite this mistake, the court in King correctly distinguished the lower
court's reliance on unreliable and untrustworthy hearsay, from the lower court's decision in
Negron, which prematurely excluded reliable hearsay. Id. at 731 & n.8. Furthermore, in King,
the court's decision to reverse the probation violation finding was consistent with the language of
Rule 6(b) because hearsay evidence was the sole evidence of a violation provided at the hearing.
See id. at 731 & n.6. Where the court's analysis in King is consistent with Rule 6, the court's
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B. The Black Sheep. Negron Decision Pulls Away from Massachusetts'
Historic Resistance to Expanding the Breadth of ConstitutionalProtections
for Probationers.
Notwithstanding the general due process exception, there has been
strong resistance by Massachusetts courts to expand constitutional
protections to probationers.5 7 In refusing to extend these constitutional
safeguards, courts have reasoned that excluding certain evidence not only
hides a probationer's non-compliance with the terms and conditions of his
probation, but, more importantly, ignores the reality that he has not been
rehabilitated and continues to pose a threat to the public.58 Courts continue
to waver regarding how far they are willing to stretch the "rehabilitative

cause" as a justification for making constitutional protections conditional. 9
Despite this history of resistance, the Negron decision shifts the focus away
from the concept of conditional liberty in favor of stricter constitutional
safeguards for probationers 6
C. Through the Looking Glass. Why a Strict Interpretationof Rule 6 is
More Consistent with the Purpose of Probationand the Concept of
ConditionalLiberty.
The question of hearsay evidence's admissibility at probation

violation hearings presents a host of issues that threaten the core purpose of

analysis in Negron is misplaced because hearsay evidence was not the sole evidence presented at
the hearing. See id. at 731 n.8; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing
evidence presented and admitted at probation violation hearing in Negron).
57 See Casey, supra note 31, at 195-97 (discussing Massachusetts' decision to not apply
exclusionary rule at probation violation hearings); see also Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841
N.E.2d 1240, 1249 (Mass. 2006) (holding probationer has no absolute and inflexible right to
confrontation). Massachusetts has enacted a set of independent rules governing probation
violation hearings. See generally supra notes 7, 30 and accompanying text (identifying
Massachusetts Rules of District Court for Probation Violation Proceedings).
58 See Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669, 670-71 (Mass. 1989) (holding
statements made in violation of Afiranda v. Arizona admissible at probation violation hearing);
see also Casey, supra note 31, at 195-96 (explaining rationale behind decision not to extend
exclusionary rule to probationers). See generally supra note 22 and accompanying text
(explaining rehabilitative purpose of probation).
59 Compare Casey, supra note 31, at 196-97 (discussing Massachusetts' decisions against
warrantless searches where probationer's diminished expectation of privacy was sole "cause"),
with Casey, supra note 31 at 205-06 (discussing Massachusetts' refusal to postpone probation
revocation hearings despite adverse effect on right against self-incrimination).
60 See infra Part IV.C (explaining how Negron increases evidentiary burden undermining
rehabilitative concept of conditional liberty).
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probation. 61 The application of Rule 6 in Negron is inconsistent with
probation's broader objective of rehabilitation because it sets forth an
additional hurdle for the admissibility of hearsay evidence. 62 The court in
Negron prescribed a determination of reliability as a prerequisite for
admission of hearsay evidence at probation violation hearings. 63 The
Negron decision is not only a snub to the purpose of probation, but the
imposition of a preliminary evidentiary ruling on reliability presents two
additional problems.64 First, imposing a preliminary evidentiary ruling
effectively undermines a court's discretion to determine reliability as
identified in the commentary of Rule 6(a).65 Second, the evidentiary
prerequisite places probation officers at an unfair disadvantage because it
requires them to engage in a legal evidentiary argument against defense
counsel. 66 Applying the new rule set out in Negron places a heightened
evidentiary obstacle for the probation department to overcome in order to
satisfy the burden of proof at a probation violation hearing. 67 The court is
essentially placing the core concept of conditional liberty under direct
attack because the additional constitutional protections effectively elevate a

61 See infra Part IV.C (discussing Negron decision as threat to probation's purpose).
62 Compare MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 1 (identifying purpose and
scope of Massachusetts' probation violation proceeding rules), and supra note 23 and
accompanying text (discussing rehabilitative aim of probation), with cases cited supra note 44
and accompanying text (articulating holding of Negron). Requiring an additional evidentiary
obstacle does not advance the purpose of probation because "[t]he success of probation as a
correctional tool is in large part tied to the flexibility within which it is permitted to operate."
Buckley v. Quincy Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 482 N.E.2d 511, 512 (Mass. 1985) (quoting
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.3 cmt. (1970)); see sources cited supra note 58
and accompanying text (suggesting reinforcing "bad behavior" flies in the face of rehabilitation).
63 See supra text accompanying note 44 (stating holding of Negron).
64 See Commonwealth v. Negron, 808 N.E.2d 294, 299 (Mass. 2004) (introducing new rule);
see also infra text accompanying notes 65-66 (outlining two additional problems presented by
Negron decision).
65 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (reasoning its court's responsibility to determine
reliability). A judge's discretion to determinate reliability in the context of other evidence
presented is effectively negated by Negron, which requires the judge to make an evidentiary
ruling on reliability prior to its admission. See Negron, 808 N.E.2d at 299.
66 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (highlighting inherent disadvantage because
Probation Officer not required to have law degree).
67 See MASS. DIST. CT. R. PROB. VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 6(b) cmt. ("'[G]ood cause' for
denying the probationer the right to confront witnesses . . . defined in terms of 'difficulty and
expense of procuring witnesses in combination with 'demonstrably reliable' or 'clearly reliable'
evidence."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1200 (Mass. 1990))); see also
Durling, 551 N.E.2d at 1198 (denoting travel burden and loss of police services on local
community justifies trumping cross-examination right); supra note 29 and accompanying text
(explaining procedural flexibility justified because probationer abused opportunity to avoid
incarceration).
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probationer back to the same liberty status as a free citizen.68
The debate over which constitutional protections can and should be
afforded to probationers is a controversial issue with expansive
repercussions for the probation system, but this ongoing dispute is simply
evidence of a larger problem: failure of the state's probation system. 69 A
combination of factors are reported to be contributing to the failure of the
probation system, including but not limited to: insufficient government
supervision, a disconnect between the court and probation department,
inadequate training of probation department staff, and the enduring crusade
by defense attorneys for greater constitutional protections for
probationers. 70 Nevertheless, neither casting blame nor dwelling on the
problem's origin will serendipitously fix the probation system. Instead, the
first step is acknowledging that the current probation system is not only in
administrative crisis, but it is also failing to foster its rehabilitative goals,
creating a revolving door into the probation department. 71 Under the
current system, it is not uncommon for a probationer who violates his or
her probation to be re-sentenced to a second or concurrent sentence of
probation. 72 Not surprisingly, where probation is an available option, it has
become the preferred disposition for most criminal defendants.
V.

CONCLUSION

Probation is a privilege, not a right. Probation's purpose is to
rehabilitate offenders so they can lead a law-abiding life. In theory,
probation is a win-win for everyone involved: the probationer maintains his
liberty, albeit conditionally; the correctional institutions are less burdened;
68

See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts' resistance to

expanding constitutional protections to probationers).
69

See Thomas Farragher & Scott Allen, PatrickAims to Take Over Probation Department,

BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2010, available at www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2010/01/24/patrick aims to take over-probation department (discussing significant
problems with current probation department); see also Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall &
Chief Justice for Administration and Management Robert Mulligan, Joint Statement in Response
to Governor Patrick's FY] Budget, THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM, Jan. 28, 2010,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/jointstatement-budgetO12810.html (acknowledging needed changes
in probation department, but disagreeing with Governor's proposal for judicial branch removal).
70 See Marshall & Mulligan, supra note 69 (identifying Governor Deval Patrick's common
criticisms of rising budget, patronage and insularity).
71 See infra note 72 and accompanying text (illustrating one of many cases where
probationers found violating probation and resentenced to probation).
72 See Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 09-P-528, 2010 WL 743505, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Mar. 5, 2010) (outlining Thacker's eight-year cycle of probation, violation and resentencing to
probation).
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and society prospers from the benefit of a rehabilitated citizen. However,
in recent years, the probation system has faced growing criticism for its
lack of supervision over probationers, exorbitant budget, and insular
bureaucracy. Some critics have suggested that the state should transfer
control of the failing probation system from the judicial branch to the
executive branch, but it is unclear whether this "quick-fix" would remedy
the problem.
Notwithstanding the many contributing factors to the failing
probation system, ignoring the reality of the current state of the probation
system is undoubtedly compromising the integrity of the court. By
chipping away at the core concept of probation, i.e. conditional liberty, the
court is exacerbating, rather than fixing, the problem. The courts are
contributing to the failing probation system by creating precedent that
directly and indirectly increases the evidentiary burdens at probation
violation hearings. By making it more difficult to show that a probation
violation occurred, the court has effectively made it easier for the
probationer to violate probation without consequence. The ability to
escape a probation violation because of an evidentiary technicality
undermines the central rehabilitative goal of probation and negates the
concept of conditional liberty.
Despite Rule 6's express authorization for admission of hearsay
evidence, in Negron the SJC strayed from precedent disfavoring the
expansion of a probationer's conditional liberty under the guise of
constitutional rights. The law's current disparity must be reconciled. On
September 30, 2009, the SJC granted further appellate review in the case of
Commonwealth v. Thissell to determine whether the hearsay evidence used
to revoke Thissell's probation, violated his due process rights according to
Durling.73 Thissell presented a prime opportunity for the SJC to expound
upon its holding in Negron, illuminate the principles of Rule 6, and directly
address the rule's constitutionality.
Notably, the Commonwealth's
appellate brief in Thissell curiously failed to cite Rule 6 as authority to
support its argument that "[t]he Judge correctly relied on GPS reports when
finding the Defendant in violation of probation because they were
admissible as business records and were 'substantially trustworthy and
demonstrably [sic] reliable." 74 The SJC could have squarely addressed the
issue of admissibility, as well as the application and constitutionality of
Rule 6 because Thissell's facts presented a situation where a probationer
73 Commonwealth v. Thissell, 928 N.E.2d 932, 933 (Mass. 2010).
74 Brief for the Commonwealth at 17-26, Commonwealth v. Thissell, 910 N.E.2d 943 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2009) (No. 08-P-1206), 2008 WL 5011192.
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was found to have violated his probation based solely on hearsay evidence.
This was an opportunity to both clarify and distinguish the application of
Rule 6 and each of its two subparts. However, the SJC did not mention
Rule 6 at any point in the opinion.75
It would have proved paramount for the SJC to directly address the
application and constitutionality of both provisions (a) and (b) of Rule 6 as
they apply to probation violation hearings. The current disharmony in the
law is the result of a series of decisions confounded by improper
terminology.
The most common misuses include referring to the
probationer as "the defendant" and use of the phrase "probation revocation
hearing" as a synonym for what procedurally is properly termed a
"probation violation hearing."
Additionally, besides addressing the
existence, application, and constitutionality of Rule 6, a primary objective
of this
decision should have been to clarify a long line of disjointed case
76
law.
Confronting the Negron decision is an important step forward in
safeguarding the integrity of the rule of law. Reconciling the Negron
decision and Rule 6 will provide the necessary guidance to the criminal
justice system by defining the concept of conditional liberty and
safeguarding against the further decline of the probation system. Turning a
blind eye to the naked Emperor is not a solution.
Ashley Wirth

75 See Thissell, 928 N.E.2d at 937. On July 1, 2010, the SJC affirmed the Thissell decision
without addressing the existence, application or constitutionality of Rule 6 with respect to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence at a probation violation hearing. Id.
76 See Commonwealth v. Foster, 932 N.E.2d 287, 292 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (noting
defendant's hearsay objection perpetuates common misunderstanding between admissibility and
sufficiency). In Foster, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals recently highlighted the need for
clarification. Id. Notwithstanding the court's discussion, the Foster case is uniquely situated
because the appeal stemmed from a Boston Municipal Court probation proceeding, and therefore
the District Court Rules of Probation Violation Proceedings, including Rule 6 only has advisory
impact. Id. at 293 n.6.

